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Case No. 20090943-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Anthony Joseph Duran,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for burglary, a first degree felony, and
theft, a third degree felony, and habitual violent offender, a penalty enhancement.
This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. May Defendant challenge the trial court's ruling that he waived any right
to have a jury determine the habitual violent offender penalty enhancement where
he repeatedly and expressly agreed with the court that it was not a jury issue?
Standard of Review. When a defendant affirmatively represents to the trial
court that he has no objection to the proceedings, any subsequent claim of error falls
within the scope of the invited error doctrine, which precludes appellate review. See

State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, | 21,128 P.3d 1171 (declining to review Winfield's jury
selection challenge where he affirmatively approved the jury panel).
2. Did the trial court properly deny a mistrial where Defendant failed to show
that he was unfairly prejudiced by Officer Cline's explanation of why he frisked
Defendant?
Standard of Review. This Court reviews a trial court's "ruling on a mistrial
motion for an abuse of discretion/' See State v. McCloud, 2005 UT App 466, \ 9,126
P.3d 775 (citing State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, f 6, 46 P.3d 230); see also State v. Wach,
2001 UT 35, f 45,24 P.3d 948 (same). This Court will not find an abuse of discretion
in the denial of a mistrial, // [u]nless the trial court's determination 'is plainly wrong
in that the incident so likely influenced the jury that the defendant cannot be said to
have had a fair trial.'" Wach, 2001 UT 35, If 45. Finally, this Court defers "to the trial
court's ruling because of the 'advantaged position of the trial judge to determine the
impact of events occurring in the courtroom on the total proceedings.'" Id. (quoting
State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219,1231 (Utah 1997)).
3. Did the trial court plainly err in not sua sponte declaring a mistrial when
Detective Buck testified that Defendant asked for an attorney, where defense
counsel emphasized this same fact during his opening statement?

2

Standard of Review. "To prevail under plain error review, a defendant must
demonstrate that (i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the
trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome." State v. Ross, 2007 UT 89, % 17,174 P.3d
628 (quotation marks and case citation omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, A N D RULES
Copies of any pertinent constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are
contained in addendum A, including: UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.5 (West 2004 &
Supp. 2009-2010).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with two counts of burglary, a first degree felony, in
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-202 (West 2004), two counts of theft, a third
degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 (West 2004); and one
count of habitual violent offender (HVO), a penalty enhancement under UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-3-203.5 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009-2010). R39-40. Specifically, counts 1-2
alleged the burglary of and theft from the Pierce home, while counts 3-4 alleged the
burglary of and theft from the Peterson home. Id. Following a 3-day jury trial,
Defendant was convicted for the burglary and theft of the Peterson home. See
R365:110-lll; see also R209-210. Because the jury was unable to reach a unanimous
3

verdict regarding the charged burglary and theft of the Pierce home, those charges
were dismissed at sentencing. See R275; see also R367:22.
Before the bench trial on the HVO penalty enhancement, Defendant moved
for a mistrial alleging that Officer Cline improperly commented on his criminal
history, and that he was entitled to have the jury decide the HVO penalty
enhancement. See R245-49. Following oral argument on the motion, the trial court
denied a mistrial. See R366:13-19. The trial court ruled that Officer Cline testified in
good faith, and that given the weight of the evidence against Defendant on the
burglary and theft counts for which he was convicted, the officer's testimony was
not unfairly prejudicial. Id. at 14-15. Regarding the HVO penalty enhancement, the
trial court ruled that before the jury was dismissed, both parties agreed that the
HVO penalty enhancement should be decided by the court rather than the jury, that
neither party objected when the trial court subsequently asked if the jury could be
released following reading of the burglary and theft verdicts, and that Defendant
failed to serve the requisite statutory notice of intent to deny the HVO charge. Id. at
16-19. Accordingly, the trial court ruled that Defendant had effectively waived his
right to have the jury decide the HVO penalty enhancement. Id. at 16-19, 21.
Before sentencing, the State adduced evidence that Defendant had been
previously convicted of three violent felonies. See R367:4-6. The trial court found
4

that Defendant was a habitually violent offender and thus subject to a first degree
penalty enhancement for his burglary conviction.

Id. at 11-23.

Accordingly,

pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.5 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009-2010), the trial
court imposed an enhanced first degree prison term of five years to life for the
burglary conviction, and a concurrent prison term of zero to five years for the theft
conviction. Id. at 21-22. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R281-87.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the morning of 28 June 2007, Defendant broke into several homes in an
Ogden City neighorbood. He was arrested within minutes of burglarizing Ryan
Peterson's home, after attempting to flee from officers. See e.g., R364:38-42,62,66-68;
R365:15. Defendant was wearing Peterson's pants at the time, wherein officers
found Peterson's ATM card and foreign currency. R363: 38-41; R364:18-19, 71, 74.
Earlier that morning, residents reported a suspicious man and vehicle in the
neighborhood. Tegan Greenfield called law enforcement at 7:26 a.m. to report that a
Ford Bronco II not belonging to her was parked in her driveway," stacked full with
things." R362:56-58,70,81; 365:13; see also State's Exhibit # 2. Greenfield provided
a description of the Bronco and license plate number. Id.
While Greenfield was talking to police dispatch, less than a block away, Sarah
Olivieri saw a strange man standing in her yard, with his back turned to her. R362:
5

88-91. When Olivieri asked if she could help the man, "he just raised his hand and
... just blew me off." R362: 93. When she asked what he was doing, he replied,
"don't worry about it." R362:93. The man again said, "don't worry about it," when
she asked if he was the reason car alarms were going off. R362: 94. Olivieri told the
man to get out of her yard, went inside, and called the police dispatch at 7:37 a.m.
R362: 94-95; R365:14.
Greenfield called law enforcement a second time that morning, around 7:40
a.m., to report she had just seen a man sprint across her yard, jump into the Bronco
II, and drive off. R362: 60, 73; R365:14. She ran after the Bronco II, but lost track of
it after it turned the corner. R362: 61-62. Greenfield described the man as largeframed, and wearing a baseball cap and dark baggy clothes that she would expect to
see a younger man wearing. R362: 60-61, 83-84. While she did not see the man's
face, at a later show-up, Greenfield said Defendant was "a good match . . . sizewise," though wearing different clothes. R362: 83-84.
Officers from several jurisdictions responded to investigate. The Bronco II
was found parked at the Pierce home at 8 a.m. R365: 14. Noticing that a sliding
glass door had been broken, officers notified the Pierces, who were at work, of the
break-in. R363: 70; see also R362:102-03. The master bedroom and other rooms had
been "ransacked." R363: 71. "There was some property stacked up by another
6

sliding glass door that looked like it was stacked up ready to be taken out of the
home. The fridge door was open and there was an open can of Dr. Pepper sitting on
the counter, and it had also been spilled on the counter and on the floor/' R363: 71.
A glove was found on the fence in the back yard. R363: 75. Homeowner James
Pierce subsequently clarified that neither the Bronco II in his driveway nor the glove
found on the back fence belonged to the Pierces, and neither he nor his wife had left
the Dr. Pepper can on the counter. See R362:104, 113-114, 117. The only thing
apparently missing from the home was a Yankees baseball cap that was never
recovered. Id.
At about 8:30 a.m., one half hour after the Bronco II was discovered in the
Pierces' driveway, an officer saw a man matching the burglary suspect's description
running across 36th Street, from one yard to another. R364:8-10, 22-23. A second
officer reported that residents had seen a man walking down Iowa Street at 8:32
a.m. At 8:46 a.m., this officer found the break-in at the Peterson home on Iowa

7

Street. R365:14-15.1 At about this time, a man came running at a full sprint and
nearly ran into the passenger door of a third officer's patrol car. R364:38-39. The
man "stopped real abrupt and then headed westbound, running/ 7 R364:39. The
officer made a U-turn, lost sight of the man for a few seconds, then saw him crossing
Harrison. R364:41-42.
Officer Cline picked up the suspect's trail at 8:47 a.m. when he saw him run
west across Harrison, into traffic, toward Kinko's. R364:65; R365:15. Officer Cline
pulled into the Kinko's parking lot, cutting off the suspect's escape. R.364:67-68. The
suspect, whom Officer Cline identified as Defendant, was at first unresponsive
when Officer Cline ordered him to get down on the ground. R364:69. Defendant
just stood there and put his arms in the air. R364:69, 98. When Defendant turned
and put his hands in a position where Officer Cline could not see them, the officer
drew his weapon and ordered Defendant to turn around.

1

R364:69. This time

Peterson, who was working in Wyoming at the time, was told that his home
had been burglarized, but that officers had recovered his ATM card. R363: 36-37.
Upon returning home, Peterson discovered a pair of green cargo pants and a tank
top in his bedroom that did not belong to him. R363:42-43. Peterson also
discovered that he was missing two bills of Philippine money a friend had given
him, see R363:45-47,50-51, as well as some clothing, including a pair of jeans, a belt,
a beanie hat, a shirt, and a pair of sunglasses, see R363: 39-41. At trial, Peterson
identified as his, the clothing marked as State's Exhibit # 12, which were the clothes
Defendant was wearing when arrested. R363: 39-41.
8

Defendant complied. Id. When Officer Cline handcuffed Defendant he noticed that
Defendant was bleeding and that he had a pink-gauze bandage wrapped around the
wound. R364:69,74-75.2 A pat-down search of Defendant yielded Peterson's ATM
card and Philippine money in his pants pockets. R364:71, 74, 94. Officer Cline
performed the pat down or Terry frisk because he knew Defendant's background
and because he knew Defendant was committing burglaries and thus might be
armed and dangerous. 3 R364:99-100.
Detective Buck interrogated Defendant at the Ogden City Police Department
with Officer Cline. R365:19. Defendant waived his Miranda rights and agreed to
speak to the detective, but stated that "he didn't know exactly what we needed to
talk to him about." 4 R365: 20. Defendant admitted to being in the area of Weber
State University, but said that he was looking for college girls. He said he started to

2

An inventory search of the Bronco II found in the Pierce's driveway yielded,
among other items, a plastic baggy containing pink-gauze tape and a meth pipe.
R363:79. Two weeks earlier, this same Bronco II was involved in an unrelated traffic
violation. R363:8-9. When the owner of the Bronco II, Leslie Borrego, could not be
located, the Bronco II was impounded. Id. at 21. XAJI inventory search of the Bronco
II at that time yielded a picture of Defendant. Id. at 6-10,19. Upon learning that a
Bronco II like Borrego's had been found at the Pierce home the morning of the
burglaries, Officer Melcher contacted Borrego at home that same day and observed
that Borrego's Bronco II was not there. Id. at 14-15.
3

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

4

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1964).
9

run when he saw police officers in the area because they made him nervous. R365:
20-21. When Detective Buck asked Defendant about the ATM card in his pocket, he
said that he did not have anything in his pocket. R365: 21-22. Officer Cline then
told Defendant that he had found the card in his pants pocket. R364: 81; R. 365: 2122. Defendant denied knowing what the officers were talking about and "indicated
[that] he wanted to talk to a lawyer." R365: 22.
At trial, defense counsel did not object to this testimony, and, on crossexamination, repeated it, stating, "And [Defendant] says at this point I'm not going
to talk to any —anymore about it. I want an attorney." R365:25. Defense counsel
also stated during both his opening statement and closing argument, that Defendant
had asked for an attorney and invoked his right to remain silent. See R362:47;
R365:91.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point L Defendant's challenge on appeal to the trial court's denial of a
mistrial is precluded by the invited error doctrine. After the jury rendered its
verdict on the burglary and theft charges and was dismissed, Defendant
unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial on the ground that he was entitled to have the
jury decide HVO penalty enhancement. Before the jury was excused, however,
defense counsel had repeatedly and expressly agreed with the trial court that the
10

penalty enhancement issue was for the trial court, not the jury, to decide. The trial
court thus denied a mistrial, ruling that defense counsel's affirmative statements
waived any right to have a jury decide the penalty enhancement issue. The trial
court correctly recognized that Defendant invited any possible error here and that
his claim should be rejected on that ground. Defendant does not claim that trial
counsel was ineffective for agreeing with the trial court that the penalty
enhancement was not a jury issue.
Alternatively, even if Defendant did not invite the alleged error, he has not
shown that he had any statutory or constitutional right to a jury trial, because he
raised no factual challenge to evidence of his prior violent convictions. The trial
court's ruling may be affirmed on this alternative ground. In State v. Palmer, the
Utah Supreme Court held that there is no federal constitutional right to a jury trial
on a penalty enhancement. The supreme court further held that even where a
penalty enhancement statute authorizes a jury trial, there still is no right to a jury
trial if a defendant raises only a pure legal challenge to the penalty enhancement.
The supreme court reasoned that there is no right to a jury trial in this circumstance,
because the legislature cannot expand the role of the jury beyond fact-finders. In
other words, even where a jury trial is authorized by statute, a defendant has no
constitutional or statutory right to a jury trial when only pure questions of law need
11

to be decided. Accordingly, even though the HVO statute authorizes a jury trial,
Defendant alleged only that the Information failed to set forth the case numbers for
his prior violent felony convictions. Defendant thus raised, at most, a technical legal
challenge to the penalty enhancement and was not, therefore, entitled to a jury trial.
Point II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial
based on Officer Cline's testimony that he frisked Defendant because he knew his
background and believed he could be dangerous. Assuming, but not conceding,
that the officer's incidental remarks were improper, they were not inflammatory
and did not influence the jury verdict. Indeed, the jury hung on the charged
burglary and theft of the Pierce home. The reason that Defendant was convicted for
the burglary and theft of the Peterson home was not because of Officer Cline's
comments, but because he was apprehended fleeing from the vicinity of the
Peterson home while wearing Peterson's clothing, and having Peterson's ATM card
and foreign currency in his pants pockets. The trial court correctly recognized that
this evidence was overwhelming, and that Officer's Cline's comments were thus not
so likely to have influenced the jury that Defendant cannot be said to have had a fair
trial.
Point IIL The trial court did not plainly err in not sua sponte declaring a
mistrial when Detective Buck testified that Defendant asked for an attorney. No
12

possible error in the detective's testimony would have been obvious to the trial
court, because in opening statement defense counsel had already emphasized this
very fact. Accordingly, Defendant's plain error claim fails as a matter of law.
Indeed, it is arguably precluded by the invited error doctrine, given that defense
counsel was the first to emphasize the evidence.

Defendant does not claim that

trial counsel was ineffective for emphasizing that he requested an attorney.
ARGUMENT
I.
DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE TO THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING
THAT HE WAIVED ANY RIGHT TO HAVE A JURY DECIDE THE
HABITUAL VIOLENT OFFENDER PENALTY ENHANCEMENT IS
PRECLUDED BY THE INVITED ERROR DOCTRINE
In Point I of his brief, Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of a mistrial
on the ground that he was entitled to have a jury decide the HVO penalty
enhancement. See Aplt. Br. at 20-29. Before the jury was dismissed, however,
defense counsel repeatedly affirmed that the penalty enhancement should be
decided by the court rather than the jury. See R364:127-28. Moreover, both parties
stipulated to the dismissal of the jury when the theft and burglary verdicts were
returned. See R365:113-114. It was only after the jury was dismissed that Defendant
moved for a mistral, asserting that he was entitled to have the jury decide the
penalty enhancement. See R245-49. The trial court denied a mistrial, ruling that
13

Defendant had waived any right to have a jury decide the penalty enhancement. See
R366:17-19~21. Defendant acknowledges that defense counsel "seemed to agree"
with the trial court that the penalty enhancement was not an issue for the jury to
decide. Aplt Br. at 24; see also id. at 23. He also acknowledges that defense counsel
affirmatively acquiesced to the trial court's release of the jury after announcement of
the theft and burglary verdicts. Id. Nevertheless, Defendant asserts that the trial
court erred "when it denied him the right to a jury trial on the habitual violent
offender enhancement," because Defendant "never affirmatively waived his right to
have this enhancement tried to the jury." Aplt. Br. at 28. Defendant's claim is
precluded by the doctrine of invited error. 5
A. The invited error doctrine precludes a party from taking
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the
trial court into committing the error.
Utah's "invited error doctrine arises from the principle that a party cannot
take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into
committing the error." Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, % 17,164 P.3d 366 (quoting State
v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, f 15,128 P.3d 1171 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)); see also State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993) (same). "By

5

Defendant does not claim that trial counsel was ineffective for agreeing with
the trial court that the penalty enhancement was a jury issue.
14

precluding appellate review, 'the doctrine furthers this principle by "discouraging
parties from intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden
ground for reversal on appeal/"" Pratt, 2007 UT 41, t I 7 (quoting State v.
Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, f 12,86 P.3d 742). A defendant is '"not entitled to both the
benefit of not objecting at trial and the benefit of objecting on appeal/" Id. (quoting
State v. King, 2006 UT 3,113,131 P.3d 202) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); see also State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1989) ("[W]e do not
appraise all rulings objected to for the first time on appeal under the plain error
doctrine. . . . [I]f trial counsel's actions amounted to an active, as opposed to a
passive, waiver of objection, we may decline to consider the claim of plain error").
Rather, the invited error doctrine encourages counsel "'to actively participate in all
proceedings to raise any possible error at the time of its occurrence," thereby
"fortifying] our l6ng-established policy that the trial court should have the first
opportunity to address a claim of error/" Pratt, 2007 UT 41, \ 17 (quoting Winfield,
2006 UT 4, ^f 15) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
B.

Defendant led the trial court into any error by repeatedly
affirming that the penalty enhancement should be decided by the
court, not the jury.
Here, before discussing jury instructions on the second day of trial, the trial

court and attorneys discussed the HVO penalty enhancement in chambers. The trial
15

court observed that it was an issue for the court, rather than the jury: " . . . [B]efore
we look at jury instructions, it's my understanding that if the jury convicts, the
question about the habitual criminal and all the enhancements, that is not an issue
for the jury to decide." R364:127. Defense counsel responded affirmatively: "No, it
is not." Id. The trial court concurred:
Right. Any enhancements or habitual criminal would simply be a
matter for the Court rather than the jury? I know at one time it was
different than that, but I think there's a case out of Provo that decided
that's no longer an issue for the jury. But I just— I wanted to make sure
that both sides are in agreement. The only thing they are going to
decide is guilt or innocence on two [c]ounts of [b]urglary, two [cjounts
of [t]heft. Is t h a t Id. at 127-28.6 Defense counsel interjected, again expressing agreement with the trial
court: "That's my understanding." M a t 28. The prosecutor had also heard that the

6

The trial court was apparently referring to State v. Palmer, 2008 UT App 206,
189 P.3d 69, affirmed with criticism, 2009 UT 55, 220 P.3d 1198, which was issued in
May 2008, approximately ten months before Defendant's March 2009 trial. See
R366:16. In Palmer, this Court held that a DUI defendant had no federal
constitutional or statutory right to have a jury decide the penalty enhancement in
that case or whether he had two prior DUI convictions within ten years of the third
conviction. See Palmer, 2008 UT App 206, ^ 2 , 22-23. This Court did not reach
Palmer's state constitutional claim because it was inadequately briefed. Id. at % 7
n.4.
[Continued on next page]
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procedure had changed. Id. Following this exchange, the trial court stated, "Okay.
All right. Both sides agree that that's not going to be an issue for the jury, the
enhancements or the habitual criminal, right?" Id. Hearing no objection, the trial
court continued, "All right." Id.
Before excusing the jury from its service on the third day of trial, the trial
court asked, "Anything else before I release the jury?" R365:113. Defense counsel
responded: "We have nothing further, your Honor." The prosecutor concurred that

6(cont.) xhe Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari, issuing its opinion
approximately one month before the trial court heard Defendant's mistrial motion.
See R366:4. The supreme court affirmed this Court's result, but vacated its
reasoning. See State v. Palmer, 2009 UT 55, ^f 10,14, 220 P.3d 1198. The supreme
court held that there was "no federal constitutional right to have a jury determine at
sentencing the factual question of whether there was a prior conviction because the
right to a jury trial was satisfied when the defendant was originally convicted." Id.
at f 12. The supreme court recognized, however, that the legislature could "create a
statutory right to a jury on that factual question." Id. at f 14. But the supreme court
further recognized that the legislature "cannot expand the role of the jury beyond
fact-finders." Id. "Thus, a defendant does not have the right, constitutional or
statutory, to a jury trial when only pure questions of law need to be decided." Id.
Because Palmer raised only a legal challenge to his prior DUI convictions (whether
they took place when he pled guilty or when he was sentenced), the supreme court
held that "the threshold requirement for a jury determination — a disputed issue of
fact—[was] absent in [Palmer]." Id. at ^ 10; see also id. at | 14. Accordingly, the
supreme court did "not reach the issue of whether a defendant who does raise a
factual question regarding his prior DUI convictions has a Utah Constitutional or
statutory right to a jury determination on that issue." Id.
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there was no further need to retain the jury. Id. The trial court then thanked the
jurors for their service and excused them. Id. at 113-14.
The trial court next asked the prosecutor if he wanted to handle the HVO
penalty enhancement at that time. Id. at 114. When the prosecutor indicated that it
was his understanding that the penalty enhancement would have to be continued
until sentencing, defense counsel agreed that it could be handled then, "or a law and
motion/ 7

Id. He also said that he might stipulate to the State's evidence of

Defendant's prior violent convictions.

Id.

Defense counsel reiterated his

understanding that it was "an issue for the Court, I'm pretty sure." Id. at 115. The
prosecutor expressed some concern about the trial court deciding the penalty
enhancement, but also indicated that it was his understanding that the court could
do so. Id. at 115-116.
The trial court reiterated that he had sought to clarify the issue before the jury
was excused and believed that they had reached a consensus of opinion: "I thought
everybody agreed because I tried to bring it up before we started. I didn't want to
get to this point and have somebody say whoops, that issue should have [been]
decided by the jury." Id. at 116. The prosecutor stated that he understood that was
the trial court's intent, but that he had not read the case to which the trial court had
earlier referred the parties; rather, he "was basically going on what everybody else
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was saying/' Id. The trial court responded that if he was wrong, and the parties
were no longer in agreement, he did not know what could be done "to correct it
now, because we've let the jury go." Id. Defense counsel remained silent during the
trial court's exchange with the prosecutor. Id. After the trial court set a sentencing
date, the hearing concluded. Id. at 117.
Before sentencing Defendant moved for a mistrial, alleging in part that he was
entitled to have the jury decide the HVO penalty enhancement.

See R245-49.

Following oral argument, the trial court denied the motion, expressing surprise that
Defendant had asked for a mistrial on this ground. R366:17. The trial court was
surprised because defense counsel had earlier (1) affirmed on the record that the
court would decide the HVO penalty enhancement; (2) did not object when —
following reading of the jury verdict—the trial court asked if the jury could be
released, and (3) failed to serve the requisite statutory notice of any intent to deny or
challenge the HVO penalty enhancement. R366:16-19. Based on these findings, the
trial court ruled that Defendant had waived any right to have a jury decide the HVO
penalty enhancement. Id.
Immediately following the trial court's denial of a mistrial, defense counsel
commented that he did not recall the trial court asking whether the parties objected
to releasing the jury, but acknowledged that "the record will speak for itself on
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that/' Id. Additionally, defense counsel observed that he did not "contemplate . . .
at this point how we could reimpanel that same jury." Id. The trial court agreed:
"Right. Well, and I don't intend to do that." Id. at 20. Defense counsel proposed
that the remaining issue was thus whether the trial court would "impanel a different
jury or whether the Court just makes that decision on its own." Id. The prosecutor
stated that the HVO statute permitted the impaneling of another jury. Id. The trial
court, however, reiterated its finding that Defendant had "waived his right to a jury
on the question of being an habitual criminal"; thus, the matter needed to be set for
a bench hearing. Id. at 21. The prosecutor stated the hearing should take no longer
than an hour, because "the Court's going to be ending up taking judicial notice of
almost everything." Id. Defense counsel agreed, observing that even if "a jury was
impaneled — I think the jury would have been instructed primarily on judicial notice
from your Honor," "[w]hich is another good reason not to have a jury." Id.
The trial court heard the State's evidence on the penalty enhancement before
imposing sentence. See R367:4. The prosecutor submitted a "Certificate of Records
of Authenticity from the Utah State Prison, which included

[Defendant's]

photograph, his fingerprints, [and his] various convictions," including convictions
for burglary in 1984, and convictions for possession of a dangerous weapon and
burglary in 1988. Id. at 4-5; see also State's Exhibit #1 (not included in record on
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appeal). Defendant did not dispute that he was in fact previously convicted for
these violent offenses.

Id. at 6-7.

Rather, Defendant objected only that the

Information had not included the specific case numbers for these convictions. Id.
The prosecutor responded that the Information was adequate, and that Defendant
had known since the 2008 preliminary hearing which of his prior convictions
supported the HVO penalty enhancement. Id. at 8. The trial court found that the
evidence supported beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was a habitual
violent offender, and accordingly, imposed an enhanced first degree felony sentence
for the burglary conviction. See R367:ll-23.
The trial court's ruling that Defendant waived any right to a jury trial on the
HVO penalty enhancement should be upheld under the invited error doctrine. The
trial court correctly recognized that defense counsel invited any error with his
repeated statements expressing agreement with the court that the penalty
enhancement was for the trial court to determine, not the jury. See R366:16-19; see
also State v. Finder, 2005 UT15, H 62-63,114 P.3d 551 (declining to review claimed
instructional error where Pinder "signaled] by an affirmative act that he had no
objection''). Indeed, the trial court noted that he was surprised by the mistrial
motion precisely because defense counsel had earlier agreed with the court's
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"interpretation of the Palmer case/' R366:17. The judge further noted that if defense
counsel "had said something [he] may have handled it differently/' Id.
As a consequence of trial counsel's express statements below, Defendant's
claim of error in being denied a jury trial on the HVO penalty enhancement is
precluded on appeal, whether the alleged violation is couched as statutory violation,
constitutional violation, or both. See Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ^ff 8-12 (holding
invited error doctrine precluded court from addressing purported structural error);
State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, | 54,70 P.3d 111 (holding jury instruction may not be
assigned as error "if counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to
the court that he or she had no objection to the jury instruction"); State v. Harper,
2006 UT App 178, f 12,136 P.3d 1261 (declining plain error review where counsel
stated he had no objections to jury instructions); State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 103, *([
7, 132 P.3d 703 (declining to review purported structural error where counsel
"affirmatively approved the instructions at trial"); State v. Clianey, 1999 UT App 309,
ITf 52-55, 989 P.2d 1091 (declining to review elements instruction omitting mental
state element, where counsel invited error); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201,1205 (Utah
App. 1991) (rejecting purported claim of structural error in reasonable doubt
instruction where counsel invited error); see also Winfield, 2006 UT 4, f 13 (declining
to review jury selection process for plain error, where Winfield, acting pro se,
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affirmatively approved panel); State v. Person, 2009 UT App 51, f 10, 204 P.3d 880
(declining plain error review where counsel conceded evidentiary hearing could be
held in Person's absence).
And Defendant's claim is precluded by the invited error doctrine even
though, after the trial court denied a mistrial, defense counsel observed that the
court could impanel another jury to decide the penalty enhancement before
sentencing. R366:20. This eleventh-hour observation did not cure any possible
invited error in excusing the jury, because defense counsel went on to acknowledge
that there was still "good reason not to have a jury" for the penalty enhancement,
particularly where jurors would be "instructed primarily on judicial notice from
your Honor." Id. at 21. Defense counsel's statement reassured the trial court that,
notwithstanding the mistrial motion, Defendant had no real objection to the trial
court's deciding the HVO penalty enhancement. See Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ^f 16
("Affirmative representations that a party has no objection to the proceedings fall
within the scope of the invited error doctrine because such representations reassure
the trial court and encourage it to proceed without further consideration of the
issues").
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Alternatively, Defendant had no statutory or constitutional right
to a jury trial on the penalty enhancement under State v. Palmer,
where he raised only a technical legal challenge to the
enhancement.
Even assuming that Defendant did not invite the alleged error, Defendant

has not shown that he had any statutory or constitutional right to have a jury
decide the HVO penalty enhancement. State v. Palmer, 2009 UT 55, 220 P.3d 1198
is dispositive. The trial court's waiver ruling may be affirmed on this sound
alternative ground. See Madsen v. Washington Mutual Bank FSB, 2008 UT 69, | 26,
199 P.3d 898 ('"an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from "if it
is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record" 7 ")
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, f 18, 29 P.3d 1225, in
turn quoting Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n, 461 P.2d 290, 293 n.2 (Utah
1969)).
The HVO statute authorizes punishing a violent second or third degree
felony as a first degree felony when the defendant is found to have committed
two prior violent felonies. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.5(2) (West 2004 &
Supp. 2009-2010). The statute requires the prosecutor to "provide notice . .. the
defendant is subject to punishment as a habitual violent offender" by including
in the information "the case number, court, and date of conviction or
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commitment of any case relied upon by the prosecution/ 7 Section 76-3203.5(3)(a). Likewise, the statute requires the defendant to "serve notice in
writing upon the prosecutor if the defendant intends to" challenge evidence of
his prior violent felony convictions. Section 76-3-203.5(3)(b). Finally, the statute
provides that "[i]f the jury's verdict is guilty, the defendant shall be tried
regarding the allegation of being an habitual violent offender by the same jury, if
practicable, unless the defendant waives the jury, in which case the allegation
shall be tried immediately to the court." Section 76-3-203.5(4)(b).7
As noted, in Palmer, the supreme court affirmed this Court's opinion that
Palmer was not entitled to have a jury decide the DUI recidivism enhancement at
issue in that case, but vacated this Court's reasoning. See Palmer, 2009 UT 55, f 18.
Palmer "sought to have a jury determine the legal rule governing when his [prior
DUI] conviction took place, whether at the time of pleading guilty or at the time of
sentencing." Id. at \ 15. The supreme court held that there was "no federal
constitutional right to have a jury determine at sentencing the factual question of
whether there was a prior conviction because the right to a jury trial was satisfied
when the defendant was originally convicted." Id. at f 12. But although there is no

7

A complete copy of the HVO statute is in addendum A.
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federal constitutional right to have a jury decide the factual question of whether
there are prior convictions, the supreme court recognized that the legislature could
"create a statutory right to a jury on that factual question." Id. at ^j 13. The supreme
court recognized, however, that the legislature "cannot expand the role of the jury
beyond fact-finders." Id. at | 14. "Thus, a defendant does not have the right,
constitutional or statutory, to a jury trial when only pure questions of law need to be
decided." Id. Because Palmer had raised a purely legal question—whether his
convictions took place when he pled guilty or when he was sentenced, the supreme
court held Palmer was not entitled to a jury trial on his prior convictions. Id. The
supreme court did not reach the issue of whether a defendant who raises a factual
question, as opposed to a legal question, regarding his prior convictions has a state
constitutional or statutory right to a jury trial. Id.
Applying Palmer here, Defendant has shown no right to a jury trial, even
though a jury trial is authorized by the HVO statute, because he did not raise a
factual challenge to the penalty enhancement, or to the existence of his prior violent
felony convictions. Rather, Defendant asserted only a "technical notice problem," or
that the Information failed to list the case numbers for his prior violent felony
convictions as required by the HVO statute. R366:8; see also section 76-3-203.5(3)(a)
("Notice shall include the case number, court, and date of conviction or commitment
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of any case relied upon by the prosecution"). Defendant does not dispute that the
certified copies of his prior violent felony convictions adduced at the bench trial
included the pertinent case numbers. See R367:5-7. More importantly, he has never
claimed that he was in fact unaware of the prior violent felony convictions relied
upon by the prosecutor, or that he was not in fact convicted of burglary in 1984, and
of burglary and possession of a dangerous weapon in 1988. See id.
In sum, Defendant raised, at most, a technical legal challenge to the HVO
penalty enhancement, not a factual challenge. Therefore, even though the HVO
statute authorizes a jury trial, see section 76-3-203.5(4)(b), Defendant raised a pure
legal challenge to the HVO penalty enhancement and is not therefore entitled to a
jury trial under Palmer. See 2009 UT 55, ^1f 10,14-18.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED A MISTRIAL WHERE
DEFENDANT FAILED TO SHOW THAT HE WAS UNFAIRLY
PREJUDICED BY OFFICER CLINE'S EXPLANATION OF WHY HE
FRISKED DEFENDANT
In Point 11(A) of his brief, Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying a mistrial where Officer Cline testified that he frisked
Defendant because he "knew the background of [Defendant]/' R364:99-100; see also
Aplt. Br. at 29. According to Defendant, Officer Cline's statement was unfairly
prejudicial, even if, as the trial court found here, evidence of the burglary and theft
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counts for which Defendant was convicted was "absolutely overwhelming/'
R366:15; see also Aplt. Br. at 33. Defendant's claim lacks merit and should be
rejected.
*

*

*

In his opening statement, defense counsel mentioned that Defendant had
outstanding warrants, explaining that the existence of the outstanding warrants
made Defendant nervous and that was why he ran from law enforcement the
morning of the burglaries. See R362:46-47.
On cross examination of Officer Cline, defense counsel asked when the officer
found Peterson's ATM card in Peterson's pants, which Defendant was wearing
when he was apprehended.

See R364:88-94.

Defense counsel showed some

confusion as to the difference between a frisk and search, and also elicited that
Defendant had outstanding warrants. See id. at 90-94.
On redirect, the prosecutor asked Officer Cline to explain the difference
between a weapons frisk and a search:
. . .[Tjhere's a difference between a pat[-]down search, a Terry
frisk is what it's . . . called by case law. Um, it's an outer search... or a
pat down of the outer area of the clothing for weapons only.
It's not an internal search through pockets, uh, through jackets,
through clothing, through things like that. Typically um, that's what
I'll do if I'm still doing the investigation and I'm building a case, and I
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don't see that there is an immediate danger of not putting my hands in
their pockets. I will do a Terry frisk for weapons.
Urn, I knew tlie background of [Defendant]. I've lieard a lot of case
information about him. Mm, and so I thought that lie possibly could be armed,
committing burglaries et cetera. So I did a pat [-] down frisk of him initially.
R366:99-100 (emphasis added). Upon further redirect, Officer Cline clarified that a
weapons frisk is not the same thing as a search, and that he found the ATM card
after he obtained consent to search Defendant's person. Id. at 100. Officer Cline also
affirmed that in his view, "even though it's a —it may be viewed as a semantic
difference, [he found the ATM card] on the first search even though [he] had
[previously] Terjy frisked [Defendant]." Id.
In closing argument, defense counsel argued that because of the outstanding
warrants, Defendant's motive in breaking and entering the homes that morning was
to secure a disguise, rather than to commit theft. See R365:90.
Defendant did not object to any of Officer Cline's testimony. Rather, while
the jury was deliberating, defense counsel made a record that during Officer Cline's
testimony, Defendant "brought to [his] attention that he had heard . . . [Officer
Cline]... bring up the fact of prior burglaries." R365:104. Defense counsel brought
the matter to the trial court's attention at the time, but neither defense counsel, the
trial court, or the prosecutor recalled hearing Officer Cline testify as Defendant
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alleged. Id. Accordingly, defense counsel had Officer Cline's testimony transcribed
and read the pertinent portion to the trial court while the jury was deliberating:
It s a y s , . . . I knew the background of [Defendant]. I heard a lot of case
information about him, and so I thought that he possibly could be
armed, committed burglaries, et cetera. So I did this pat down search
on him.
R365:105. Defense counsel indicated that this was the testimony that he missed, and
that he was not sure what to do about it: "I want to think about it/7 Id. The
prosecutor asserted that defense counsel wanted to wait and see what the jury
verdict would be. See id. The trial court observed that he was not being asked to
rule on anything at that time. See id. at 106. Defense counsel concurred: " And . . .
I'm going to be straightforward with the Court. Here's the dilemma I'm dealing
with. Frankly, I don't know what motion to make." Id. The trial court responded
that "it may all be moot. I don't know what the verdict is going to be here/' Id. at
107. Defense counsel expressed concern that if he made a mistrial motion "now,
and the Court grants it. We go back to trial on both charges." Id. When the trial
court agreed, defense counsel stated that he would make a motion for a mistrial or
for a new trial after the jury rendered its verdict: "That's probably what I want to
do." Id. at 107-08.
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Following the jury verdict, Defendant moved for a mistrial, asserting that
Officer Cline's explanation of why he frisked Defendant for weapons, including that
he "knew the background of [Defendant]/' had "heard a lot of case information
about him/' and accordingly, "thought that [Defendant] possibly could be armed,
committing burglaries et cetera," R364:99-100, was prejudicial. The trial court
declined to grant a mistrial. R366:15-16. The trial court ruled that Officer Cline's
comment was not "something that the officer just threw out on his own," but rather
came in response to a question on redirect "about the difference between a search
and a pat down or a frisk of the defendant." Id. at 14. The trial court further ruled
that Officer Cline "was trying the best he could to answer what he thought the
question was," and accordingly, acted "in good faith." Id. Finally, the trial court
ruled that, taken in context, the officer's explanation was not prejudicial. Id. at 15.
Indeed, the trial court found that the officer's comments were "incidental and
insignificant"

and that the evidence against Defendant was

"absolutely

overwhelming," where he was apprehended wearing Peterson's clothes and had
Peterson's ATM card and foreign currency in his pocket. Id.
Defendant fails to show that the trial court abused its discretion by declining
to grant a mistrial based on Officer Cline's testimony. First, even assuming Officer
Cline's comments were improper, Defendant affirmatively decided against moving
31

for a mistrial before the jury delivered its verdict and was thereafter released. See
R365:107-08. Accordingly, any possible error here was arguably invited and should
not be addressed. See Point I, above, and authorities therein. Any possible error in
the officer's comments could have been rendered harmless by a timely curative
instruction. See State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, f | 35-38,994 P.2d 177. But Defendant's
postponement of the mistrial motion until after the jury rendered its verdict and was
dismissed, precluded this remedy. See State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262,271 (Utah 1998)
("[Cjurative instructions are a settled and necessary feature of our judicial process
and one of the most important tools by which a court may remedy errors at trial").
Second, even if Defendant did not invite the alleged error, Officer Cline's
comments were not made in bad faith, but were "isolated off-hand remark[s],
buried in roughly [362] pages of testimony." Wach, 2001 UT 35, f 46; see also R362365; see also State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 1071,1073 (Utah 1989) (holding trial court's
inadvertent statement, if error, was harmless error). Importantly, the prosecutor did
not rely on the officer's comments in closing argument See R 365:62-79, 93-100.
It is also significant that neither the trial court, the prosecutor, nor defense
counsel took note of the officer's comments. See R365:104. The fact that neither the
trial court, the prosecutor, nor the defense counsel took note of Officer Cline's
statements at the time "is a sign that what was said sounded less exciting at trial
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than appellate counsel now would have it seem." Cf. Commonwealth v. Deveau, 606
N.E.2d 921, 924 (Mass. App. 1993) (rejecting claim of prosecutorial misconduct on
ground that prosecutor's closing argument, while improper, did not amount to
reversible error).
Moreover, Officer Cline's comments were "not necessarily inflammatory,"
particularly given that defense counsel earlier elicited that Defendant had
outstanding warrants. Wach, 2001 UT 35,146; see R364:91,93-94. As noted, defense
counsel asserted in opening statement that Defendant's outstanding warrants were
the real reason why he ran from officers, not because he thought he was a burglary
suspect. See R362:46-47. In closing, defense counsel argued that Defendant was
motivated by the outstanding warrants to enter the victims' homes to secure a
disguise, not to necessarily deprive the homeowners of their property. See R365:90.
Jurors were thus well aware that Defendant had some criminal history before
Officer Cline made his comments at trial. Officer Cline's comments were also not
inflammatory when compared to the evidence of Defendant's conduct that morning,
including that he disturbed residents in their private yards, broke into and entered
two different homes, fled from officers, and was apprehended wearing Peterson's
clothing—with Peterson's ATM card and foreign currency in his pants pockets.
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Finally, nothing in the record shows that the jury was improperly influenced
by Officer Cline's comments about Defendant's background. See Johnson, 771 P.2d at
1073. To the contrary, if Officer Cline's statements had in fact been the basis for the
jury's guilty verdicts, jurors would have also convicted Defendant for the burglary
and theft of the Pierce home. See R366:ll-12. Given the totality of the evidence
against Defendant, and the reasonable inferences therefrom, it was not Officer
Cline's statements about Defendant's background that caused the jury to convict
Defendant for the burglary and theft of the Peterson home. Rather, it was the fact
that Defendant was apprehended as he fled from the vicinity of Peterson's home,
wearing Peterson's clothing, and carrying Peterson's ATM card and foreign
currency in the pants pockets. As observed by the trial court, the evidence against
Defendant was "absolutely overwhelming." R366:15.
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Officer Cline's
statements about Defendant's background did not merit a mistrial. As noted,
Defendant may well have invited any error here by postponing his mistrial motion
beyond the time in which the trial court could give a curative instruction. In any
event, the trial court correctly recognized that even if the officer's statements were
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improper, they were not "so likely [to have] influenced the jury that the defendant
cannot be said to have had a fair trial." Wach, 2001 UT 35, f 45.8
III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR IN NOT SUA
SPONTE DECLARING A MISTRIAL WHEN DETECTIVE BUCK
TESTIFIED THAT DEFENDANT ASKED FOR AN ATTORNEY,
BECAUSE DEFENSE COUNSEL EMPHASIZED THIS FACT
DURING HIS OPENING STATEMENT
In Point 11(B) of his brief, Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in not
declaring a mistrial after Detective Buck testified that Defendant asked for an
attorney. Aplt. Br. at 33-38. Defendant acknowledges that he failed to preserve this
issue below, but asserts that it is nonetheless reviewable under the plain error
doctrine. Aplt. Br. at 35. As will be shown, any possible error here could not have
been plain or obvious to the trial court, or prejudicial to Defendant, because defense

Defendant asserts that Officer Cline's explanation of why he frisked him
violated rules 403, and 404(b), of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See Aplt. Br. at 30-31.
However, Defendant did not preserve this claim in moving for a mistrial below. See
R245-50; see also R366:12-13. And he does not assert plain error or exceptional
circumstances on appeal. See Aplt. Br. at 30-31. Accordingly, Defendant's claim that
the officer's explanation for the frisk violated rules 403 and 404(b) may not be
reviewed. See State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ^ 23 n.6,128 P.3d 1171 (declining to infer
plain error argument); State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1230 n.5 (Utah 1995) (same).
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counsel emphasized this very fact during opening statement. 9 Defendant's plain
error claim thus fails as a matter of law and should be rejected on that ground.
A. The plain error doctrine requires Defendant to show that an error
exists, the error should have been obvious to the court, and that
the error is harmful.
To prevail on his claim of plain error here, Defendant "must demonstrate that
(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii)
the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable outcome." State v. Ross, 2007 UT 89,117,174 P.3d 628 (quotation marks
and case citation omitted). "If any one of these requirements is not met, plain error
is not established." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1209 (Utah 1993).
B.

No possible error in Detective Buck's testimony would have been
obvious to the trial court where defense counsel emphasized the
fact that Defendant asked for an attorney in his opening
statement.
In opening statement, defense counsel provided an overview of the facts,

including that Defendant asked for an attorney when Detective Buck and Officer
Cline confronted him with Peterson's ATM card, which had been found in the
pants Defendant was wearing when apprehended:

9

Defendant does not claim that trial counsel was ineffective for emphasizing
the fact that Defendant requested an attorney.
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When asked about the ATM card in his pocket, [Defendant] said I
don't, you know, I don't know what you're talking about I'm willing
to talk to you. Uh, you know, I'm here. You've advised me of my
rights, I'm willing to talk to you. But, you know, about the arrest, but
they asked him about that and he said what? I don't have —didn't
have one in there. And they —then they said well, I pulled it out of
your pocket. And at this point he decides lie better have an attorney and lie
refuses to talk.
R362:47 (emphasis added). Defense counsel went on to assert that Peterson's ATM
card had not been found the first time that officers "searched" Defendant. See id.
On direct examination of Detective Buck, the prosecutor accordingly asked
about Defendant's response when confronted with Peterson's ATM card:
Prosecutor: Okay. Now, did you ask the defendant about the credit
card found in his pocket?
Det Buck:

Yes, I did.

Prosecutor: What was his response when you asked him that?
Det. Buck:

He told me he didn't have anything in his pocket.

Prosecutor: At that point did someone else talk?
Det. Buck:

Yes, at that point Officer Cline indicated that he was the
officer that took it out of his pocket.

Prosecutor: What did the defendant say after Officer Cline made that
statement to the defendant?
Det. Buck:

At that point he said* he didn't know what we were
talking about and he indicated he wanted to talk to a lawyer
before we questioned him further.
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R365:22 (emphasis added).

Defense counsel did not object to the detective's

testimony; rather, on cross examination, defense counsel repeated it:
Counsel:

And [Defendant] says at this point I'm not going to talk to
any — anymore about it. I want an attorney.

Det. Buck:

Yes.

R365:25 (emphasis added).
During closing argument, defense counsel again mentioned the fact that
Defendant asked for attorney, in support of his argument that Defendant entered
Peterson's home because he was looking for a disguise, not to commit theft, and
thus did not know about the ATM card in his pocket:
I think it's fair to say there were certainly not two people involved in
moving the car. All of the evidence is the car was so full of stuff that
only one person could have done it. And if it wasn't [Defendant], it
could have the Peter —the Martinez'— we don't know who it was.
When asked about the card, [Defendant] said I don't what you're
talking about. But then tltey said well, I got it out ofyour pocket and then at
that point he said I better talk to my attorney.
R365:91 (emphasis added).
Based on the above, including that defense counsel's opening statement
emphasized that Defendant requested an attorney, no possible error in Detective
Buck testifying to that same fact would have been obvious to the trial court.
Accordingly, Defendant cannot prevail on his claim that the trial court plainly erred
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in not sua sponte declaring a mistrial when Detective Buck testified that Defendant
asked for an attorney. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209. Indeed, given that defense
counsel was the first to note that Defendant requested an attorney, Defendant's
claim of plain error here arguably constitutes invited error, which doctrine
precludes a claim of plain error. See Point I, above, and authorities cited therein.
Moreover, Defendant's plain error claim also fails because he cannot show
prejudice. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209. As shown in Point I, the jury acquitted
Defendant of the burglary and theft of the Pierce home, and there was
overwhelming evidence that he committed the burglary and theft of the Peterson
home.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
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Addenda

Addendum A

Addendum A

U.C.A. 1953 § 76-3-203.5
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
K
4 Chapter 3. Punishments (Refs & Annos)
NS Part 2. Sentencing
•*§ 7 6 - 3 - 2 0 3 . 5 . Habitual violent offender—Definition—Procedure—Penalty

(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Felony" means any violation of a criminal statute of the state, any other state, the United
States, or any district, possession, or territory of the United States for which the maximum
punishment the offender may be subjected to exceeds one year in prison.
(b) "Habitual violent offender" means a person convicted within the state of any violent felony and
who on at least two previous occasions has been convicted of a violent felony and committed to
either prison in Utah or an equivalent correctional institution of another state or of the United States
either at initial sentencing or after revocation of probation.
(c) "Violent felony" means:
(i) any of the following offenses, or any attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit any of the
following offenses punishable as a felony:
(A) aggravated arson, arson, knowingly causing a catastrophe, and criminal mischief, Title 76,
Chapter 6, Part 1, Property Destruction;
(B) assauit by prisoner, Section 76-5-102 5;
(C) disarming a police officer, Section 76-5-102.8;
(D) aggravated assault, Sectioji 7_6-5-103;
(E) aggravated assault by prisoner, Section 76-5-103.5;
(F) mayhem, Section 76-5-105;
(G) stalking, Subsection 76-5-106.5 (2) or (3);
(H) threat of terrorism, Section 76-5-107.3;
(I) child abuse, Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a) or (b);
(J) commission of domestic violence in the presence of a child, Section 76-5-109,1;
(K) abuse or neglect of disabled child, Section 76-5-110;
(L) abuse, neglect, or exploitation of a vulnerable adult, Section 76-5-111;
(M) endangerment of a child or vulnerable adult, Section 76-5-112.5;
(N) criminal homicide offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 2, Criminal Homicide;
(O) kidnapping, child kidnapping, and aggravated kidnapping under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 3,
Kidnapping, Trafficking, and Smuggling;
(P) rape, Section 76-5-402;
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(Q) rape of a child, Section 76-5-402 1 ;
(R) object rape, Section 76-5-402 2;
(S) object rape of a child, Section 76-5-402 3;
(T) forcible sodomy, Section 76-5-403;
(U) sodomy on a child, Section 76-5-403 1 ;
(V) forcible sexual abuse, Section 76-5-404;
(W) aggravated sexual abuse of a child or sexual abuse of a child, Section 76-5-404.1;
(X) aggravated sexual assault, Section 76-5-405;
(Y) sexual exploitation of a minor, Section 76-5a-3;
(Z) aggravated burglary and burglary of a dwelling under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 2, Burglary
and Criminal Trespass;
(AA) aggravated robbery and robbery under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3, Robbery;
(BB) theft by extortion under Subsection 76-6-406(2)(a) or (b);
(CC) tampering with a witness under Subsection 76-8-508(1);
(DD) retaliation against a witness, victim, or informant under Section 76-8-508 3;
(EE) tampering with a juror under Subsection 76-8-508.5(2)(c);
(FF) extortion to dismiss a criminal proceeding under Section 76-8-509 if by any threat or by
use of force theft by extortion has been committed pursuant to Subsections 76-6-406(2)(a),
(b), and (i);
(GG) possession, use, or removal of explosive, chemical, or incendiary devices under
Subsections 76-10-306(3) through (6);
(HH) unlawful delivery of explosive, chemical, or incendiary devices under Section 76-10-307;
(II) purchase or possession of a dangerous weapon or handgun by a restricted person under
Section 76-10-503,
(JJ) unlawful discharge of a firearm under Section 76-10-508;
(KK) aggravated exploitation of prostitution under Subsection 76-10-1306 ( l ) ( a ) ;
(LL) bus hijacking under Section 76-10-1504; and
(MM) discharging firearms and hurling missiles under Section 76-10-1505; or
(n) any felony violation of a criminal statute of any other state, the United States, or any district,
possession, or territory of the United States which would constitute a violent felony as defined in
this Subsection (1) if committed in this state.
(2) If a person is convicted in this state of a violent felony by plea or by verdict and the trier of fact
determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is a habitual violent offender under this

section, the penalty for a:
(a) third degree felony is as if the conviction were for a first degree felony;
(b) second degree felony is as if the conviction were for a first degree felony; or
(c) first degree felony remains the penalty for a first degree penalty except:
(i) the convicted person is not eligible for probation; and
(n) the Board of Pardons and Parole shall consider that the convicted person is a habitual violent
offender as an aggravating factor in determining the length of incarceration.
(3)(a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment is returned, shall provide notice in the
information or indictment that the defendant is subject to punishment as a habitual violent offender
under this section. Notice shall include the case number, court, and date of conviction or commitment
of any case relied upon by the prosecution.
(b)(i) The defendant shall serve notice in writing upon the prosecutor if the defendant intends to
deny that:
(A) the defendant is the person who was convicted or committed;
(B) the defendant was represented by counsel or had waived counsel; or
(C) the defendant's plea was understanding^ or voluntarily entered.
(n) The notice of denial shall be served not later than five days prior to trial and shall state in
detail the defendant's contention regarding the previous conviction and commitment.
(4)(a) If the defendant enters a denial under Subsection (3)(b) and if the case is tried to a jury, the
jury may not be told until after it returns its verdict on the underlying felony charge, of the:
(i) defendant's previous convictions for violent felonies, except as otherwise provided in the Utah
Rules of Evidence; or
(n) allegation against the defendant of being a habitual violent offender.
(b) If the jury's verdict is guilty, the defendant shall be tried regarding the allegation of being an
habitual violent offender by the same jury, if practicable, unless the defendant waives the jury, in
which case the allegation shall be tried immediately to the court
(c)(i) Prior to or at the time of sentencing the trier of fact shall determine if this section applies
(n) The trier of fact shall consider any evidence presented at trial and the prosecution and the
defendant shall be afforded an opportunity to present any necessary additional evidence.
(m) Prior to sentencing under this section, the trier of fact shall determine whether this section is
applicable beyond a reasonable doubt.
(d) If any previous conviction and commitment is based upon a plea of guilty or no contest, there is
a rebuttable presumption that the conviction and commitment were regular and lawful in all
respects if the conviction and commitment occurred after January 1, 1970. If the conviction and
commitment occurred prior to January 1, 1970, the burden is on the prosecution to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was then represented by counsel or had lawfully
waived the right to have counsel present, and that the defendant's plea was understandingly and
voluntarily entered.

(e) If the trier of fact finds this section applicable, the court shall enter that specific finding on the
record and shall indicate in the order of judgment and commitment that the defendant has been
found by the trier of fact to be a habitual violent offender and is sentenced under this section.
(5)(a) The sentencing enhancement provisions of Section 76-3-407 supersede the provisions of this
section.
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (5)(a), the 'Violent felony'' offense defined in Subsection ( l ) ( c )
shall include any felony sexual offense violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, Sexual Offenses, to
• determine if the convicted person is a habitual violent offender.
(6) The sentencing enhancement described in this section does not apply if:
(a) the offense for which the person is being sentenced is:
(i) a grievous sexual offense;
(ii) child kidnapping, Section 76-5-301.1;
(iii) aggravated kidnapping, Section 76-5-302; or
(iv) forcible sexual abuse, Section 76-5-404; and
(b) applying the sentencing enhancement provided for in this section would result in a lower
maximum penalty than the penalty provided for under the section that describes the offense for
which the person is being sentenced.
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